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
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A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIR

CONCERNING

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to which is added

AN EXAMINATION

OF

Mr. LOCK's ſcheme of FREEDO

Impartial deductions of reaſon, in controverted point very rare; and exact ones, in abſtract notions, very di and, therefore, I ſhould think my ſelf not a little be to any one, who would, upon theſe, or any other g fairly clear this ſubject of liberty from any difficulties, th yet remain. Lock's eſſay concerning humane under ding, ii. 21. §. 71.

LONDON.

Sold by *S. Popping*, at the *Black Raven* in P noſter-row. MDCCXVII.

Philosophy
Hebber
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33854

TO

James Samson, Esq;

IT is so rare a thing, to find young gentlemen of flowing fortunes, who are not, either by the vanity of their minds, misled into all the extravagancies of free-thinking; or, by the rankness of their appetites, hurried into all the filthinesses of debauchery: that I cannot but profess a most passionate respect for those, whom heaven has sav'd from the epidemical infection. as I have the greatest reason to esteem you one of those happy persons, so highly

favor'd

favour'd of God; in compliment to my ſelf, I ſend you this ſmall preſent, in which I have endeavor'd to aſſert the dignity of human nature, and do ſome ſervice to religion. The poor conceit of an irreſiſtible fatality is, no doubt, one of the ſtrongeſt opiates to a troubleſom conſcience, and a huge temptation to be lewdly witty. Virtue, ſays the free-thinker, conſiſts in ſuch actions, as are, in their own nature, pleaſant: ſuch a train of actions, ſays the rake, have I projected, or rather am I deſtin'd to. as I am a neceſſary agent, abſolutely determin'd, in every choice, by the irreſiſtible impreſſions of things; it won'd be as ridiculous, as impoſſible, to ſtrive againſt the preſent ſatisfactions of ſenſe and appetite: as to a future account, I am utterly unconcern'd; a righteous God can never puniſh me for thoſe things, which he himſelf laid me under an unavoidable neceſſity of doing.' Thus the wretch wantonly reproaches the author of his being, and depretiates the dignity of his own nature; laboring to delude himſelf into a ſtupid ſecurity: and, thus harden'd into a habit

of

of bold licentiouſneſs, he ſins on, without proſpect or remorſe, 'till, perhaps, the ſorrows of death encompaſs him, and the pains of hell get hold upon him. If by the means of ſuch conſiderations, as I have ſuggeſted; and, which you, my good friend, will, with tender compaſſion, embelliſh and enforce, on all occaſions; any precious ſouls ſhall be ſav'd from ſuch a deſpicable idea of their own faculties, and from the dangerous influences of ſuch diſheartning principles; I ſhall rejoyce exceedingly.

And, now I turn my thoughts on you; I muſt congratulate your friends, that providence hath call'd you to the bar, through all the reſtraints of modeſty; and the temptations of an eſtate to indolence, and inactivity: 'tis a widening your capacities to a larger ſphere of ſervice, and ſatisfaction; and a proſpect, that gives me no ſmall pleaſure. for, when I conſider the good ſtock of ſenſe that God has truſted to your care, with what induſtry you have improv'd it, and with what advantages

you

you are now entring upon the ſtage of action; I cannot help looking a little forward, where, methinks, I ſee you receiving the applauſes of the multitude, with all the decency of a humble mind; and the careſſes of your friends, with the exquiſit ſatisfaction of honeſt gratitude. Go on, my dear friend, with reſolution and cheerfulneſs; and God be with you.

A

CONVERSATION

BETWEEN

L---w a Freewiller
C-----s a Fataliſt

CONCERNING

HUMAN LIBERTY.

(*L---w*)

WHETHER *man be a free, or a neceſſary agent*, is, no doubt, a queſtion of importance. for this reaſon, I have read your ſentiments on the ſubject with attention, and am ready to examin 'em with

the utmoſt impartiality. As I am heartily in queſt of *truth*, I cou'd not anſwer it to my own mind, ſhou'd I endeavour to evade the force, or obſcure the evidence of your arguments: if therefore I ſhou'd miſrepreſent any of 'em, you'll attribute it to any thing, rather than deſign; and do me the favour to rectify my miſtakes. I am ſenſible I might give my animadverſions an advantage with the populace, by upbraiding you, on all occaſions, with the name of Free-thinker, and exclaiming againſt you, as a man of impious deſigns, againſt religion and morality: but ſince you pretend, by the doctrin you advance, rather to ſecure, than ſubvert, the foundations of morality and laws, and of rewards and puniſhments in ſociety [1]; I think I ought rather to run the riſque of reproaches from ſome narrow-minded zealots, than indulge to the indecencies of paſſion, and offer violence to charity.

I. Your argument from *experience*, is only an appeal to every man's breaſt; and there I leave

[1] *A philoſ. inquir. lib* iv. *preſ. p.* 14.

I leave it [2]. Your *authorities* muſt ſtand or fall by their own intrinſic value. if any of your authors have given better reaſons than your ſelf, you have not done juſtice to the ſubject; if they have not, I have ſufficiently conſider'd Their arguments in the examination of Yours. ſetting aſide, therefore, what you are pleas'd to advance by way of apparatus, and overplus; I ſhall proceed directly to weigh your reaſons with all the

[2] *though I cannot forbear thinking with the great* Dr. Clark, *that* We have all the ſame Experience, the ſame marks and evidence, exactly, of our having really a power of ſelf motion, that is, of acting freely; as the rigideſt Fataliſt cou'd poſſibly contrive to require, if he was to make a ſuppoſition of a man's being endued with that power. There is no one thing, which ſuch a man can imagin ought to follow from the ſuppoſition of liberty, which every man does not now as much feel, and actually experience in himſelf, as it can poſſibly be imagin'd any man wou'd do, ſuppoſing the thing were true. Wherefore, to affirm that the ſpirits, by which a man moves the members of his body, and ranges the thoughts of his mind, are themſelves moved wholly by air, or ſubtler matter inſpired into the body; and that again by other external matter, and ſo on; (as the wheels of a clock are mov'd by weights, and thoſe weights by gravitation, and ſo on;) without a man's having the leaſt power, by any principle within himſelf, to think any one thought, or impel his

accuracy, the little time, I cou'd gain for this purpoſe, will admit. in order to this, I pray you to repreſent your firſt reaſon, which you call your ſecond Argument, with all the plainneſs and conciſeneſs you can.

II. (*C—s.*) Man is a neceſſary agent, Becauſe *all his actions have a beginning*: and, whatever has a beginning, muſt have a cauſe [1]. (*L—w.*) That is, A man is a neceſſary agent, becauſe he muſt will to act, before he acts [2]. (*C—s.*) But, That will to act muſt have a cauſe [3]; and every cauſe is a neceſſary cauſe [4]. (*L—w.*) That is, That will to act muſt be determin'd.

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own ſpirits, in order to move any member of his body: all this is ſo contrary to experience, and the reaſon of things; that, unleſs the idea of ſelf motion were, in it ſelf, as evidently and clearly a contradiction, as that 2 and 2 ſhould make 15; a man ought to be aſham'd to talk at that rate. *demonſtr. p.* 139.

[1] *A philos. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 57.

[2] if this be all you mean, as your words ſeem to intimate, 'tis plainly nothing to the purpoſe.

[3] this is what you aim at in the main, (*I. p.* 49. 75.) and the only conſideration, that gives plauſibility to your argument.

[4] *or no* cauſe at all. for, a cauſe not ſuited the effect, and *no cauſe*, are the ſame thing. *p.* 58, 59.

determin'd [5]. but, ſtill, the queſtion rema
Whether the mind be determin'd to will,
the nature of things, and conſequently
ceſſarily; or whether it may not determin
ſelf, and therefore be free. the former
aſſert without proof [6]: for the latter you h
the reaſons and authority of an uncomn
genius, the AB of Dublin [7].

III. (*C—s.*) Man is a neceſſary agent,
cauſe *liberty*, according to all the various
ſcriptions given of it by Theologers and I
loſophers, *would often be an imperfection,
never a perfection* [8]. (*L—w*) That is, M
is not a free agent, becauſe To be fi

[5] for, when any thing is propos'd to the mind, it mu
ther chooſe, or refuſe. *V. Lock, eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. 6.

[6] at leaſt, in this argument. and yet you come to thi
remtory concluſion, that Liberty, or a power to act or n
act, to do this or another thing under the ſame cauſes, i
impoſſibility, and atheiſtical: impoſſible, forſooth, bec
you ſay ſo; atheiſtical, becauſe the Epicureans (*Lucret*
251. *Euſeb. præp. evang.* vi. 7.) and Saducees (*Joſeph. antiq.*
2.) were great aſſerters of liberty. *p.* 59.

[7] *de orig. mal.* v. 1. 3. *p.* 112. *ap. Key to divin. p.* 19.

[8] *A philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 62.

n any sense, would often be an imperfection [a]. This, I think, is your argument in its full force: though, why a man may not be supposed to be free, lest he shou'd seem imperfect, is to me unintelligible. Now, if a man may have liberty, though it were an imperfection; your pains to prove it so [1], are to no purpose: especially, since the AB of Dublin notwithstanding all your endeavors to disguise the evidence of his reasons, has plainly demonstrated, that A being, endow'd with choice, which has, in it self, the principle of its own actions, is more noble, and perfect, than a being, that is not [2].

IV. (C—s.)

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[a] as for instance, Men wou'd be irrational, and miserable; and, by consequence, imperfect agents; if they had such a freedom, (p. 63.) as (1) To be able to pass different judgments, at the same instant of time, upon the same individual propositions, that are not evident: *Le Clerc, bibl. ch. t.* 12. *p.* 88. (2) To be able to oblige the understanding, by the force of choice, to admit what is false to be true: *King, de orig. mal. c.* 5. *p.* 133. *ap. Key to div. p.* 37. *§.* 12. (3) To be able to will evil, as well as good: *Cheyne, phil. princ. c.* 3. *§.* 13.

[1] in 12 pages, from *p.* 69. to *p.* 82.

[2] *de orig. mal. c.* 2. *p.* 139. *ap. Key to div. p.* 43.

IV. (*C—s.*) Man is a neceſſary agent, Becauſe *God certainly foreſees all things future.* for, if he Certainly foreſees him, they muſt Neceſſarily be: becauſe he can foreknow their certain exiſtence, only either as that exiſtence is the effect of his decree, or as it depends on its own cauſes. If he foreknows that exiſtence, as it is the effect of his decree; his decree makes that exiſtence neceſſary: for it implies a contradiction for an all powerful being to decree any thing, which ſhall not neceſſarily come to paſs. If he foreknow that exiſtence, as it depends on its own cauſes, that exiſtence is no leſs neceſſary; for it no leſs implies a contradiction, that cauſes ſhould not produce their effects, (cauſes and effects having a neceſſary relation to, and dependence on each other) than that an event ſhou'd not come to paſs, which is decreed by God [3]. (*L—w.*) (1) As to

[3] *Aphiloſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 82. So *Cic.* de div. ii. 18. *Cartes.* princ. part. 1. art. 41. *Lock*, lett. p. 27. *Stillingfl.* of Chr. ſatisf. p. 355. *Tillotſ.* ſerm. vol. 6. p. 157. *South*, ſerm. vol. 5. p. 488, &c.

[4] Mr.

to the certainty of God's *foreknowledge*, All, that the greateſt oppoſers of liberty have ever urg'd, or can urge, upon this head, amounts only to this; that Foreknowledge implies Certainty, and Certainty implies Neceſſity. But (1) *the certainty of foreknowledge does not cauſe the certainty of things*; but is it ſelf founded on the reality of their exiſtence. Whatever now is, 'tis certain that it is; and it was yeſterday, and from eternity, as certainly true, that the thing would be to day, as it is now certain that is is. and this certainty of event is equally the ſame, whether it be ſuppos'd that the thing could be foreknown, or not. for, whatever at any time is; it was certainly true from eternity, as to the event, that that thing would be: and this certain truth of every future event wou'd not at all have been leſs, though there had been no ſuch thing as foreknowledge. bare preſcience, therefore, has no influence at all upon any thing; nor contributes, in the leaſt, towards making it neceſſary *. (2) *Certainty of*

* Dr. Clark endeavours to illuſtrate this by a compariſon: We know

of event does not, in any ſort, imply neceſſity. For, let a fataliſt ſuppoſe, that there was in man a power of beginning motion, that is, of acting freely; and let him ſuppoſe further, if he pleaſe, that thoſe actions cou'd not poſſibly be foreknown: will there not yet, notwithſtanding this ſuppoſition, be, in the nature of things, the ſame certainty of event in any one of the man's actions, as if they were never ſo fatal and neceſſary? for inſtance: ſuppoſe the man by an interternal principle of motion, and an abſolute freedom of will, without any external cauſe or impulſe at all, does ſome particular action to day; and ſuppoſe it was not

know certainly, *ſays he*, that ſome things are; and when we know that they are, they cannot but be: yet 'tis manifeſt, our knowlege does not at all affect the things, to make them more neceſſary, or more certain. Now foreknowlege in God is the very ſame as knowlege. all things are to him, as if they were equally preſent, to all the purpoſes of knowlege and power. he knows perfectly every thing that is: and he foreknows whatever ſhall be, in the ſame manner as he knows what is. As, therefore, knowlege has no influence on things that are; ſo neither has foreknowlege, on things that ſhall be. *demonſtr. p.* 167.

poſſible that this action ſhou'd have been foreſeen yeſterday; was there not, nevertheleſs, the ſame certainty of event, as if it had been foreſeen? that is, would it not, notwithſtanding the ſuppos'd freedom, have been as certain a truth yeſterday, and from eternity, that this action was in event to be perform'd to day, (though ſuppos'd ever ſo impoſſible to have been foreknown,) as it is now a certain and infallible truth that it is perform'd[5]? (2) As to the nature of God's *Decrees*, we are to conſider that all our words, when we ſpeak of ſpiritual points, are equivocal, and improper; and, eſpecially, when we ſpeak of God, highly metaphorical[6]. ſo that we are dangerouſly deceiv'd, when, judging the infinite eſſence by our narrow ſelves, we aſcribe intellections, volitions, decrees, purpoſes, and ſuch immanent actions, to that nature, which has nothing in common with us, as being infinitely

[5] Clark, *demonſtr.* p. 172.

[6] Sergeant, *meth. to ſcience. l.* 3. *leſſ.* 10. p. 362.

[7] Glanvil,

nitely above us[7]. Thoſe powers, properties, and operations, the names of which we transfer to God, are but faint ſhadows, and reſemblances; or, rather indeed, emblems, and parabolical figures of the divine attributes, which they are deſign'd to ſignify[8]; ſo that we cannot, with reaſon, pretend to make any other deductions from the na-

[7] Glanvil, *ſceps. ſcientif. c.* 13. *p.* 74.

[8] NB. (1) *Our reaſon teaches us to aſcribe theſe attributes to God by way of reſemblance, and analogy to ſuch qualities or powers, as we find moſt valuable or perfect in our ſelves.* For, we ought to remember, that the deſcriptions which we frame to our ſelves of God, or of the divine attributes, are not taken from any direct or immediate perceptions, that we have of him, or them; but from ſome obſervations we have made of his works, and from the conſideration of thoſe qualifications, that we conceive would enable us to perform the like. Thus, obſerving great order, conveniency, and harmony, in all the ſeveral parts of the world; and perceiving that every thing is adapted, and tends to the preſervation and advantage of the whole; we are apt to conſider, that we could not contrive, and ſettle things in ſo excellent and proper a manner, without great *wiſdom*: and thence conclude, that God, who has thus concerted and ſettled matters, muſt have wiſdom; and having then aſcrib'd to him wiſdom, becauſe we ſee the effects and reſult of it in his works; we proceed, and conclude that he has likewiſe *foreſight and underſtanding*, becauſe

tures of one to that of the others; than thoſe, he has allow'd us to make: or extend the parallel any farther, than that very inſtance, which the reſemblance was deſign'd to teach us. Thus, (that I may apply this poſition to the point in hand) it is the part of a wiſe man to conſider beforehand what is proper for him to do, to preſcribe means and methods to obtain his ends; to lay down ſome ſcheme or plan of his work, before he begins; and to keep reſolutely to it in the execution: and therefore it is after this manner the Scripture repreſents God, as purpoſing, and contriving

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we cannot conceive wiſdom without theſe: and becauſe if we were to do what we ſee he has done, we could not expect to perform it, without the exercise of theſe faculties. And it doth truly follow from hence, that God muſt either have theſe, or other powers equivalent to them, and adequate to thoſe mighty effects, which proceed from them. and, becauſe we do not know what his faculties are in themſelves, we give them the names of thoſe powers, that we find would be neceſſary to us, in order to produce ſuch effects; and call them wiſdom, underſtanding, and fore-knowledge: but, at the ſame time, we cannot but be ſenſible, that they are of a nature altogether different from ours; and that we have no direct and proper notion or conception of them. only we are ſure, that they have

effects

contriving beforehand all his works. So when God is ſaid to predetermin, and preorder all things according to the counſel of his will; the importance of this expreſſion is, that all things depend as much on God, as if he had ſettled them according to a certain ſcheme, and deſign, which he had voluntarily fram'd in his own mind, without regard had to any other conſideration, beſides that of his own mere will and pleaſure. If then, we underſtand predetermination, and predeſtination in this analogous ſenſe, to give us a notion of the irreſiſtible power of God, and that ſupreme dominion, he may exerciſe over his creatures; it will

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effects like unto thoſe that, do proceed from wiſdom, underſtanding, and fore-knowlege in us; and, that, when our works fail to reſemble them in any particular, as to perfection, it is by reaſon of ſome want or defect in theſe qualifications. (2) *Such a knowlege is ſufficient to all the ends and purpoſes of religion:* the deſign whereof is to lead us in the way to eternal happineſs; and, in order thereunto, to teach and oblige us to live reaſonably; to perform our duty to God, our neighbours, and our ſelves. (3) *And we hardly know any thing, without our ſelves, in a more perfect manner.* If we conſider ſeriouſly the knowlege we have of thoſe creatures, and even of thoſe things in the world, with which we are

moſt

will help us to underſtand what that ſovereignty is, that God has over us; the ſubmiſſion we ought to pay to him; and the dependence we have upon him; and ſo far we may uſe, and preſs them: but to conclude from thence, that theſe are inconſiſtent with free-will, is to ſuppoſe that they

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moſt familiarly acquainted; it will appear, that the conceptions we have of them are much of the ſame ſort, as theſe we, which religion gives us of God; and that they neither epreſent the nature or eſſential properties of the things, as hey are in themſelves; but only the *effects* they have in relaion to us. Nevertheleſs we call the things, whoſe actions on our ſenſes cauſe theſe ſenſations in us, by the ſame name we give to our conceptions of them; and treat and ſpeak of hem, as if they were the ſame. We ſay the fire is hot; becauſe t produceth heat in us: and that the ſun is light; becauſe it ffects our eyes in ſuch a manner, as enables us to frame that hought, which we then perceive in our ſelves. But, in the ean time, we are altogether ignorant what it is particularly the fire, or ſun, that has theſe effects on us; or how it omes thus to affect us: and yet, this ignorance of ours doth ot hinder us from the uſe, or advantage, that nature deſign'd s in theſe ſenſations: nor does our transferring to the obcts themſelves the names, that we give our own perceptions them, draw any evil conſequences after it: on the contra, they ſerve the uſes of life, as well, as if we knew the ey things themſelves. *W. King, ſerm. on predeſtin.*

? King

they are the ſame in him, and us: and juſt as reaſonable, as to infer, becauſe wiſdom is compar'd, in Scripture, to a tree of life; that therefore it grows in the earth, has its ſpring and fall, is warm'd by the ſun, and fed by the rain [9].

V. (*C——s.*) If man was not a neceſſary agent, neceſſarily determin'd by pleaſure and pain, *there would be no foundation for rewards and puniſhments*, which are the eſſential ſupports of ſociety. Were pain, as ſuch, eligible; and pleaſure, as ſuch, avoidable: of what uſe would be the proſpect of rewards, to frame a man's will to the obſervation of the law; or puniſhments to hinder the tranſgreſſion thereof [1]? (*L——w.*) Indeed, if we were abſolutely free, we might be abſolutely happy [2]; and, ſo, inſenſible to the influence of rewards and puniſh-

[9] King, *Serm. on predeſtin. p.* 7.

[1] *A philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 86.

[2] for what is happineſs, if not to be, always, in all things, as we chooſe to be.

for

puniſhments [3]: but it is not in our power, by the ſovereignty of choice, to extinguiſh all ſenſe of pain, or entirely over-rule all the repreſentations of reaſon, and the importunity of the appetites. the freewiller, therefore, as he is a man of like paſſions and frailties with the fataliſt, is capable of the ſame impreſſions of fear, and ſubject to the ſame reſtraints of puniſhment. or, if the freewiller can chooſe to be hang'd, and ſo take off the terror of the puniſhment; the fataliſt can look upon it as a leſs evil than want; and, thereby, make it a ſufficient good to determin his will to ſteal. thus both, alike, can make a ſhift to break laws, in ſpite of penalties: only there ſeems to be ſome difference in the caſe, in that the free-willer, being conſcious to himſelf that he is the cauſe of his own actions, is likelier to be checkt by the horrible apprehenſions of a future account at the bar of heaven, than the fataliſt; who, being unable to do any thing of himſelf, cannot

[3] for he is no leſs happy, that can chooſe what he knows will be, than he that cauſes to be what he has choſen.

[4] he

cannot eaſily ſuppoſe that he has any thing to anſwer for [4].

VI. (*C*——*r.*) If man was not a neceſſary agent, *he would not be a moral agent.* or thus: If man was not neceſſarily determin'd by pleaſure and pain, he would have no notion of morality, or motive to practiſe it [5]. (*L*——*w.*) How ſo? (*C*——*r.*) Becauſe morality, or virtue, conſiſts in ſuch actions, as are, in their own nature, pleaſant; immorality, or vice, in ſuch actions, as are, in their own nature, painfull. and therefore a

[4] he may rather hope to periſh with the beaſts: ſince, upon your own principles, he has no more freedom. It is allow'd, *ſay you*, that beaſts are neceſſary agents; and yet there is no perceivable difference between their actions, and the actions of men, from whence they ſhould be deem'd neceſſary, and Men free agents. Man has indeed larger powers, and larger weakneſſes; but, being of the ſame kind with the powers and weakneſſes of beaſts, cannot contain liberty in them; and, plainly, make no perceivable difference between them and men, as to the general cauſes of action in finite intelligent and ſenſible beings; no more than the different degrees of theſe powers and weakneſſes, among the various kinds of beaſts, birds, fiſhes, and reptiles, do among them. *a philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 53. 56.

[5] *A philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 88, 89. [6] A philoſ.

man must be affected with pleasure and pain, in order to know what morality is: and to distinguish it from immorality. he must also be affected with pleasure and pain, to have a reason to practise morality; for there can be no motives, but pleasure and pain, to make a man do or forbear any action. (*L—w.*) This argument seems to me so unaccountably strange, that I am afraid I do not understand you. You say *virtue and vice* consist in such actions, as are in their own nature pleasant or painfull. this is what I cannot conceive, any more than why you refer to Mr. *Lock*, (*ii.* 20.) for an account of it. that great man says indeed, that things are *good and evil*, only in reference to pleasure and pain: so that we call that good, which is apt to cause pleasure in us; as grapes are good to him, that loves 'em: and that evil, which is apt to produce pain in us; as Grapes are evil to him, that hates 'em. Now, that you should

[a] *A phil. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 88, 89.

ſhould fancy, that Mr. *Lock*, by *good and evil*, meant *virtue and vice*, is what I cannot believe; and that you ſhould go about to gain credit to your odd poſition, by pretending the authority of ſo celebrated a philoſopher, is what I muſt not ſuppoſe; (for I had rather ſuſpect my own underſtanding, than call in queſtion your honor.) but, be that as it will, for aught I can perceive, a man, even according to your ſcheme of virtue and vice, may have a notion of morality, and motives to practiſe it, though he be not always determin'd by pleaſure and pain; that is, though he be a free agent. for though he may have a faculty that can, in many caſes, overrule even reaſon it ſelf, and render things agreeable, by chooſing them; yet it does not follow, that it always muſt, or ever ought to do ſo: and conſequently, ſince (notwithſtanding the indifferency of this faculty) he is capable of being affected with pleaſure and pain, by good and evil in things; he may alſo have a notion of your morality, and motives too to practiſe it.

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN *L—w, Lock, C—s,* CONCERNING HUMAN LIBERTY.

(*L—w.*)

WHAT is your notion of *Free-will*[1]? (*L—k.*) To Will is to chooſe[2]; and I am ſo far Free, as I am able to do what I

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[1] The term *free-will* is not, perhaps, the moſt proper: * but, ſince cuſtom has made it currant, it looks like too much affectation wholly to lay it by.

* *it is as inſignificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to ask, whether his ſleep be ſwift, or his virtue ſquare. liberty being as little applicable to the will, as ſwiftneſs of motion is to ſleep, or ſquareneſs to virtue. for, liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents; and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is alſo but a power.* Lock. eſſ. on hum. und. ii. 21. §. 14.

philoſophy it ſelf, though it likes not a gaudy dreſs.

I chooſe [3]. (*L—w.*) Do you then judge your ſelf to be a free agent? (*L—k.*) I do [4]. (*L—w.*) Why? (*L—k.*) Inaſmuch as I can do what I will [5]. (*L—w.*) But are

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dreſs; yet, when it appears in public, muſt have ſo much complacency, as to be cloath'd in the ordinary faſhion and language of the country, ſo far as it can conſiſt with truth and perſpicuity.

[2] *Will* is a power, in an agent, to begin or forbear, continue or end, ſeveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind, ordering, or as-it-were commanding the doing, or not doing, ſuch, or ſuch a particular action. *eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. §. 5.

[3] *Liberty* is a power, in any agent, to do or forbear any action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is prefer'd to the other. Where either of them is not in the power of the agent, to be produc'd by him, according to his volition; there he is not at liberty; that agent is under neceſſity. ſo that liberty cannot be, where there is no volition; but there may be volition, where there is no liberty. *eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. §. 8.

[4] *eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. C—s, *a philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 113.

[5] Thus, if I will, I can ſit or ſtand, ride or walk, think on this or that ſubject, reſolve or ſuſpend my reſolution, as I pleaſe; unleſs confin'd, or prevented by pain, convulſive motions, an apoplexy, or ſome ſuch intervening reſtraint and compulſion. C—s, *a philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 114. Now, ſo far as a man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction

are you free to will? (*L*—*k.*) No[6]. (*L*—*w.*) Why? (*C*—*s.*) Becauſe in every propoſal of ſomething to be done, which is in our power to do; we cannot but have ſome immediate will[7]. (*L*—*w.*) Right; we muſt neceſſarily will either to act, or to forbear: but are we not at liberty to will or chooſe one, or the other, of two or more objects? (*C*—*s.*) No: for we muſt follow the laſt judgment of the underſtanding. (*L*—*w.*) That is to ſay, we

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n of his own mind; ſo far is he free: and we can ſcarce d how to imagin any being freer, than to be able to do hat he wills. *Locke, eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. 8. 21. by this er of liberty or *freedom from compulſion*, God is plainly the moſt free being that can be conceiv'd; becauſe the doing or forbearing all actions, according to the determination of his will, are in his power. C—s, *An eſſay concerning the uſe of words in propoſitions, the evidence whereof depends upon human reflexion.* p. 47.

[6] *Eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. 8. 22. C—s, *a philoſ. inquiſ. concern. lib.* p. 37.

[7] for inſtance, let it be propos'd to a man to walk: if preſently; the will to walk, or not to walk, exiſts immediately: if to-morrow; he is no leſs oblig'd to have ſome immediate will. he muſt either have a will to defer willing about the matter propos'd, (*which is ſuſpending the will*) or muſt will

we muſt neceſſarily will a thing, when it is ſuppos'd that we do will it [8]. (C—s.) But, what I would mean, is this: that when two or more objects are propos'd, if we *find* a difference, we muſt chooſe the beſt [9]; if no difference, we cannot chooſe at

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will immediately in relation to the thing propos'd; and one, or the other, of thoſe wills muſt exiſt immediately, no leſs than the will to walk, or not to walk in the former caſe. *C—s, a philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 38.

[8] for the laſt judgment of the underſtanding, is nothing elſe, but a man's final determining either to chooſe, or not to chooſe a thing; that is, 'tis the very ſame with the act of volition. *Clark, demonſtr. p.* 162.

[9] for willing, or preferring, being only judging that one thing, upon the whole, is better than another: we muſt will, or prefer, as things ſeem to us; unleſs we can lye to our ſelves, and think that to be worſt, which we think beſt. *a philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 41. Wherefore, to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or reſt, ſpeaking or ſilence, which he pleaſes; is to ask, whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleas'd with what he is pleas'd with. a queſtion, which, I think, needs no anſwer. *Locke, eſſ. on hum. und. ii.* 21. 9. 25. So *Plato*, opp. vol. 1. p. 345, 358. *Bramhal*, opp. p. 65, 658. *Bayle*, rep. aux queſt. vol. 3. p. 756. *Norris*, theory of love. p. 199.

[1] Let

at all [1]. (*L—w.*) True: but, If we can *make* a difference [2], we may chooſe either [3]; and

[1] Let us put a caſe of true equality or indifference; and, what I have aſſerted, will more manifeſtly apppear true. Let two eggs appear perfectly alike to a man; and let him have no will to eat or uſe eggs: [*] it is manifeſt no choice would, or could, be made: and the man is viſibly prevented in the beginning, from making a choice. for every man experiences that before he can make a choice among eggs, he muſt have a will to eat, or uſe an egg; otherwiſe he muſt let them alone: and he alſo experiences, in relation to all things, which are the objects of his choice, that he muſt have a precedent will to chooſe, otherwiſe he will make no choice. *a philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 50.

[*] *for ſo the caſe ought to be put, to render things perfectly indifferent to him: becauſe, if once a will to eat eggs be ſuppos'd, that will muſt neceſſarily introduce a train of cauſes, which will ever deſtroy an equality of circumſtances, in relation to the things, which are the objects of our choice. there will ſoon follow a ſecond will to eat one firſt: and theſe two wills muſt put the man upon action, and the uſage of the parts of his body to obtain his end; which parts are determin'd, in their motions, either by ſome habitual practice, or by ſome particular circumſtance at that time; and cauſe the man to chooſe, and take one of them, firſt, rather than the other.*

[2] That is, If there be ſuch a principle in nature, as can make agreeableneſs, and goodneſs in things, by willing: and, if we are poſſeſt of that principle.

[3] This is the notion of liberty propos'd by the AB of *Dublin*: (*Key to divin. p.* 12, &c.) which to me, I confeſs, ſeems the moſt reaſonable, and encumber'd with the feweſt difficulties.

[a] To

and, if we cannot, we are not free at all. (*C—r.*) How does that appear? (*L—w.*) Becauſe *we muſt do what we will* [4], *and we muſt will what appears to be beſt* [5].

(*L—k.*) But, To me, free-will ſeems to conſiſt in this, that, when ſeveral goods are

[4] To prefer the doing, or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once propos'd to his thoughts, is unavoidably neceſſary: upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows. *Lock eſſ. on humand.* ii. 21. §. 23. for inſtance, If we will thinking or deliberating on a ſubject, or will reading, or walking, or writing; we find we muſt do thoſe actions, unleſs ſome external impediment, as an apoplexy, or ſome intervening cauſe hinders us; and then, we are as much neceſſitated to let the action alone, as we were to act according to our will, had no ſuch external impediment to action happen'd. ſo that in our actions, conſequent to willing, we alſo experience perfect neceſſity. C—s, *a philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 52.

[5] for, There are cauſes of the appearing good or evil conſequences, and cauſes of thoſe cauſes, and ſo on; and no one action, in this long progreſſion of cauſes, extend it as far as you pleaſe, could poſſibly not happen. for, ſuppoſe the color and flavor of a peach makes me will it; while it appears thus agreeable, I muſt will it. the peach muſt appear thus agreeable, while my appetite and organs are diſpos'd, as they are; and innumerable cauſes have preceded, to make the peach appear in the manner it does: ſuch as the care of the gardiner, *&c.* C—s. *eſſ. on the uſe of reaſ. p.* 48.

propos'd, I can, in moſt caſes, *ſuſpend* my deſire, examin the objects on all Sides, and weigh them with others; and, ſo, act according to the laſt reſult of a fair examination [6]. (*L*——*w*) That is, you can will to defer willing about them. But, is that will determin'd by any thing? (*L*--*k*.) Moſt certainly: it is the laſt judgment of the underſtanding, made upon the apparent advantages of deferring to will, or forbearing to chooſe. (*L*--*w*.) Why then, we are, where we were [7]: The will is determin'd by the

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[6] *eſſ. on hum. underſtand.* ii. 21. *ſ.* 47.

[7] Though great ſtreſs is laid on the caſe of *ſuſpending the will*, to prove liberty; yet there is no difference between that, and the moſt common caſes of willing, and chooſing, upon the manifeſt excellency of one object before another. For, as, when a man wills, or chooſes living in *England*, before going out of it; (in which will he is manifeſtly determin'd by the ſatisfaction he has in living in *England*) he rejects the will to go out of *England*: ſo, a man, who ſuſpends a will about any matter, wills doing nothing in it at preſent, or rejects for a time willing about it; which circumſtances of wholly rejecting, and rejecting for a time, make no variation, that affects the queſtion. ſo that, willing, or chooſing ſuſpenſion, is like all other choices, or wills, we have. C—s *Miſc. inqui. conc. hum. lib. ſ.* 39.

[8] Nay,

the laſt judgment of the underſtanding; or, We muſt chooſe what ſeems beſt. (C——*s.*) And, is it not a perfection to be neceſſarily determin'd to will, always, what is beſt [s]? is not God himſelf neceſſarily determin'd by what is beſt [q]? (*L—w.*) As to *God*, it is unpardonably abſurd to imagin, that any goodneſs in things determin'd his will; ſince all things muſt neceſſarily have, both their exiſtence, and their goodneſs, from his will [r]. As to *Man*, this doctrin makes him abſolutely paſſive, and utterly incapable of virtue or vice, rewards or puniſhments. for, The nature of things determins his ideas [2], his ideas determin his

[s] Nay, were we determin'd by any thing, but the laſt reſult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. and, if it were fit for ſuch poor finite creatures, as we are, to pronounce, what infinite wiſdom and goodneſs could do; I think, we might ſay, that God himſelf cannot chooſe what is not good; the freedom of the almighty hinders not his being determin'd by what is beſt. *Lock, eſſ. on hum. und.* ii. 21. §. 48. 49.

[q] *a philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 74.

[r] *V. King. de orig. mal.* v. 1. 4. *ap. Key to divin. p.* 23.

[2] as to the *perception of ideas*, there can be no diſpute, but it is a neceſſary action of man, ſince it is not even a voluntary action. The ideas both of ſenſation and reflection offer themſ-

judgment [3], his judgment determins his will, and his will determins his actions [4]. (C—s.) But may not a man, though a neceſſary agent, and abſolutely paſſive, be capable of virtue and vice, rewards and puniſhments?

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themſelves to us, whether we will or no; and we cannot reject 'em. We muſt be conſcious that we think, when we do think; and, hereby, we neceſſarily have the ideas of reflection: we muſt alſo uſe our ſenſes, when awake; and, thereby, neceſſarily receive the ideas of ſenſation. And, as we neceſſarily receive ideas, ſo each idea is neceſſarily what it is, in our mind: for, it is not poſſible to make any thing different from it ſelf. C—s, *a philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib. p.* 31.

[3] as to *judging of propoſitions*, the mind is neceſſarily determin'd by appearances. all propoſitions muſt appear to me either ſelf-evident, or evident from proof, or probable, or improbable, or doubtful, or falſe. Now theſe various appearances of propoſitions to me, being founded on my capacity, and the degree of light propoſitions ſtand in to me; I can no more change thoſe appearances in me, than I can change the idea of red rais'd in me; nor can I judge contrary to thoſe appearances. For, what is judging of propoſitions, but judging that propoſitions do appear as they do appear; which I cannot avoid doing, without lying to my ſelf; which is impoſſible. C—s. *a philoſ. inq. conc. hum. lib. p.* 33.

[4] of theſe I have ſpoken ſufficiently. ſee p. n.

ments? (*L—w.*) No, becauſe If I do, what I cannot But do, when I judge right; where's my virtue, [5] or deſert? and, if I cannot Help doing, whatever I do; where's my crime, or why am I puniſh'd? (*C—s.*) Why, though you cannot help doing, whatever you do; yet your *conſcience* may accuſe you, and the *law* may puniſh you. (*L—w.*) How does that appear? (*C—s.*) *As to the firſt*, Conſcience being a man's own opinion of his actions, with relation to ſome rule; he may, at the time of doing an action contrary to that rule, know that he breaks that rule; and conſequently act with a reluctance, though not ſufficient to hinder the action: but, after the action is over, he may not only judge his action to be contrary to that rule; but, by the abſence of the pleaſure of the ſin, and by finding himſelf obnoxious to ſhame, or by believing himſelf liable to puniſhment, he may really accuſe himſelf; that is, he may condemn himſelf for having done it, be ſorry he has done it, and wiſh it undone, becauſe of the

[5] If it be ſaid *in judging right*; ſtill, that judgment is neceſſary, being determin'd by appearances: if *in willing to judge right*; that will alſo depends upon the judgment, repreſenting the advantages of due examination, [6] *appli-*

the conſequences that attend it [6]. (*L—w.*) At that rate, A man may accuſe himſelf for falling down a precipice, when puſht by an irreſiſtible force; becauſe he has broke his leg: or condemn himſelf for killing his father; when a ruffian of ſuperior ſtrength, fixt a dagger in his hand, and forc'd it into his father's bowels. He may, indeed, lament his condition; but conſcience can give him no pain; unleſs he was conſcious to himſelf that he could have prevented it [7]. (*C—s.*) But, *as to the ſecond*, The law, very juſtly and rightly, regardeth only the will, and no other preceding cauſes of action. and, therefore, To render the puniſhment of criminals juſt, it is ſufficient that they were voluntary agents, or had the will do the crime, for which they ſuffer [8]. (*L—w*) Well, I'll allow that It is *of uſe* to ſociety, [9] to repreſent reaſons, to entreat, to admoniſh, to blame, to praiſe, [1] to threaten, and to inflict puniſh-

[6] *philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib.* p. 103.
[7] *V. Key to divinity.* p. 34. §. 5.
[8] *philoſ. inqui. conc. hum. lib.* p. 93.
[9] C—s, *a phil. inqui. conc. hum. lib.* chap. III. p. 98.
[1] C—s, *a phil. inqui. conc. hum. lib.* chap. II. p. 95. C—s,

puniſhments on men for doing what they cannot avoid doing, to the end that neceſſary cauſes may exiſt to form the wills of thoſe who in virtue of them neceſſarily obſerve the laws; [2] and, conſequently, that it is *juſt*, in human laws, to maintain ſociety, by puniſhing ſuch, as will to do an ill action, without any regard to the ſtrength of temptation, ill habits, or any other cauſes preceding the action: in order, partly to cut of noxious members; and partly to prevent ſuch crimes, by terrifying others. but, I beſeech you, is it conſiſtent with your notion of God, to ſuppoſe he can puniſh his creatures for thoſe actions, which he laid 'em under an unavoidable neceſſity of doing? It is not, indeed, for the thing form'd, to ſay to him that form'd it, why haſt thou made me ſo? but, ſure, if he has made us ſo, he cannot expect we ſhould be otherwiſe; any more than he can require reaſon from a rock, or puniſh the proud waves for knowing their decreed place.

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[2] C--s, *a phil. inqui. conc. hum. lib. obj.* II. *p.* 96.

[3] C--s, *a phil. inq. conc. hum. lib. obj.* I. *p.* 91, 96.

THE END.

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